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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
October 3, 1973 
-
-
No. 73-120 Marburger, Commr. of Ed. of New Jersey, 
et al v. Public Funds for Public Schools of 
New Jersey, et al 
No. 73-121 Griggs, et al v. Public Funds for Public 
Schools of New Jersey2- et al 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Attached is a proposed order setting forth a limited note of 
probable jurisdiction in the above cases, restricted to the "auxiliary 
services" issue. * The draft order grants the motion to appear as 
amicus filed in No. 73-120 on behalf of one of the vendors of educa-
tional goods supplied to nonpublic schools. The draft restates the 
question that is to be noted, as I find that neither the No. 73-120 
Jurisdictional statement nor the opposing Motion to Affirm contains 
a sufficiently neutral statement of the "auxiliary services" issue. ** 
In addition, the proposed order modifies the USDC preliminary 
injunction to allow the state to pay vendors for goods ordered and 
delivered during the period from May 29, 1973 (the date this Court 
stayed the USDC preliminary injunction) until the vendors received 
notice of this Court's further order of June 25, 1973 (vacating the s;ay). 
Finally, the draft affirms the USDC judgment in all other respects. 
With regard to the attachment, the following facts and allegations 
appear in the initial and supplemental jurisdictional statements in No. 
73-120, the motion to affirm in Nos. 73-120 and 73-121 and brief in 
*For an analogous limited note of probable jurisdiction, see Zicarelli v. 
New Jersey state Commission of Investigation, OT 1970 Journal of the 
U.S. Supreme Court 334 (March 1, 1971). 
**While the J. S. in No. 73-121 raises the auxiliary services issue, 






opposition to supplemental jurisdictional statement in No. 73-120, and 
the amicus submission (by a vendor) in No. 73-120: 
The three judge USDC issued its opinion on April 5, 1973. 
(No. 73-120 J. S. App. A at la). That opinion closed by, inter alia 
enjoining state officials "from disbursing further funds under [the' 
challenged New Jersey Act] and from otherwise participating in the 
administration or execution of the Act." Id., at 31a-33a. The USDC 
issued its preliminary injunction order on-May 15, 1973. Id., at 33a. 
The relevant paragraph of that order for present purposes is number 
(4), which preliminarily enjoins state officials: 
• . • from paying vendors for such supplies, instructional 
materials and equipment delivered by vendors to nonpublic 
schools after vendors received notice of the [USDC's] 
April 5, 1973 opinion; provided, however, that vendors 
may be reimbursed for goods delivered to nonpublic schools 
prior to receiving such notice; •.• Id., at 35a. 
On May 29, 1973 this Court stayed the USDC's preliminary 
injunction pending further order of the Court. Marburger, et al v. 
Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey, et al, 412 U.S. 916; 
EDL-New Jersey, Inc. Amicus Brief App. A. The Court vacated 
this stay on June 25, 1973, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White 
and Rehnquist dissenting. 93 S. Ct. 3024; EDL-New Jersey, Inc. 
Amicus Brief App. B. 
According to the supplemental J. S. in No. 73-120, state 
officials placed orders for supplies, instructional materials and equip-
ment during the period of this Court's stay. No. 73-120 Supp. J. s . 
at 3. The state officials assert that they moved promptly, allegedly 
t o avoid lapse of fiscal year 1973 funding authority as of June 30, 1973, 
and to allow the goods to reach the schools prior to the opening of the 
1973-74 school year. When the Court vacated its stay, state officials 
claim to have notified vendors immediately to cease deliveries. 
Nevertheless, the state officials allege that at least $3 million in 
orders were "filled by the vendors and delivered to nonpublic schools. 
• • . , " apparently during the period of the Court's stay. Id. at 3-4. 
Appellees allege that the "section 6 goods ordered during the stay 
period were not delivered until the end of the 1972-73 school year 






school year. No. 73-120 Brief in Opp. to Supp. J. S. at 7, first note. 
Appellees also claim that the vendors have the right to repossess the 
materials at issue, "all of which were new and unused." Id. A 
vendor appearing as amicus in No. 73-120 alleges that it "supplied" 
educational materials to nonpublic schools between June 13, 1973 
and June 25, 1973, apparently in the amount of $319, 833. 45. 
EDL-New Jersey, Inc. Amicus Brief at 2. 
On several occasions in July, 1973, state officials moved the 
USDC to modify its preliminary injunction to permit the State to pay 
vendors for supplies, instructional materials and equipment delivered 
during the period from May 29, 1973 (the date of issua:r..cc of this 
Court's stay) until the date at which the vendors received notice that 
the Court had, on June 25, vacated its stay. No. 73-120 Supp. J. S. 
at 4; No. 73-120 Brief in Opp. to Supp. J. S. at 2-3. The USDC denied 
these requests in an opinion and order issued July 30, 1973, with the 
sole comment that the motion was "without merit". No. 73-120 
Supp. J . S. App. at .. 3a. The state officials then filed their Supp. J. S., 
challenging the USDC 's refusal to modify its preliminary injunction 
to reflect the impact of this Court's stay order. Appellees joined 
issue on this point in their Brief in Opp. to Supp. J. S. Thus, the 
issue whether the USDC's preliminary injunction should be modified 
to protect vendors who acted during this Court's stay has been raised 
by the named parties. It was not interjected solely by amicus. 
s s 
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No. 73-120. MARBURGER, COMMISSIONER OF 
EDUCATION OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL _y. PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. No. 73-121. GRIGGS, ET AL.v. 
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL. 
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey. 
The motion of the EDL-New Jersey, Inc. for leave to file a 
brief as amicus curiae in support of Appellants' supplemental juris-
dictional statement in No. 73-120 is granted. In these cases probable 
jurisdiction is noted limited to the question whether section 6 of the 
New Jersey Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
impermissibly advances religion or creates excessive entanglement 
with religion by authorizing public school personnel to perform 
auxiliary services in nonpublic schools, where such services include 
remedial reading, speech, and physical educa ion courses, guidance 
and testing services, and health services. The cases are consolidate~ 
and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument. 
Paragraph ( 4) of the District Court's preliminary injunction 
order, entered May 15, 1973, is modified by the addition of the 
:fbllowing proviso: "further provided that vendors may be reimbursed 
for goods ordered by the state and delivered to nonpublic schools 






notice of the action taken by the United States Supreme Court in this 
matter on June 25, 1973; .•• " As to all other questions set forth in 
the jurisdictional statements, the judgment is affirmed. Reported 
below: F. Supp. __ • 
2. 
-
.. f' + t -
September 4, 1974 
WQLM.aj:\ et al v. ESSEX I et al 
Petition for injunction pending disposition 
of appeal in this Court 
To MR. JUSTICE STEWART: 
In your absence, I was asked to enfoin the 
implementation of an Ohio statute provid ng State aid 
to non-public schools, pending the resolution of an appeal 
in this Court. Although the issue presented is difficult 
and my ultimate view may be that the statute is invalid, 
I denied the motion for an injunction at this time. For 
your information, I summarize my reasons for this action. 
The challenged statute provides a procedure whereby 
students of non-public schools gain access to certain 
materials and services provided students of public schools. 1 
State appropriated funds are allocated bi-annually to the 
local public school districts which, in turn, are authorized 
to spend them for materials or specified teaching and 
counseling services for students of non-public schools. ~ 
1. The instant statute, which has been in effect since 
December of 1971, is substantially identical to a predecessor 
section adopted in 1967. Several appropriations have been 
adopted pursuant to both statutes. The latest, adopted on 
August 15, 1973, is the subject of this litigation. It 
totals $89,000,000 and appears to represent a substantial 
increase over previous appropriations. 
•~ •• ~. - -
2. 
The statute requires that materials provided students 
of the non-public schools not exceed in cost or quality 
those given the public schools, and there are limitations 
against secular use. The public school purchases the 
materials and retains title to them. It then lends the 
materials to the non-public schools in response to the 
needs of those institutions. The materials vary from one 
school district to the next, and have included such items 
as movie projectors, weather forecasting charts, lunar 
terrain m2dels, fossil collections, and audio recording 
devices. ' 
The statute establishes a similar procedure for 
providing special instructors at State expense. The public 
school employs the instructors and retains responsibility 
for their supervision and control. The teachers are then 
sent into the non-public schools upon request. The 
teaching services authorized under this provision generally 
consist of services for handicapped students, including 
speech and hearing services, remedial reading programs, 
and guidance, testing and counseling programs. 
In July of 1973, at petitioners request a three-judge 
court was convened to consider the constitutionality of the 
Ohio statute. An interlocutory injunction was issued 
restraining expenditures of money provided under a supplemental 
2. An affidavit of the State Department of Education's 
Director of Finance indicates that the materials, like the 
special teaching assistance, are to be used only in the 
instruction of the handicapped, and that the program is not 
designed to permit aid to basic education. Petitioners 
have not indicated otherwise. However, examination of the 
list of materials indicates that many can be used in more 
general instruction, and the statute provides that the 
materials and services can be used for "the improvement 
of the educational and cultural status of disadvantaged 






appropriations bill signed in August of 1973. On July 
1, 1974 the court µpheld the major portion of the statute, 3 
and petitioners then requested the court to enjoin 
implementation of the statute pending the resolution of 
an appeal in this Court. 
Petitioners allowed their request for relief in the 
district court to drift unresolved for some time before 
deciding to requesting an injunction from this Court. An 
affidavit submitted by counsel for petitioners indicates 
that the District Court did not schedule a hearing on 
petitioners• motion and made no ruling on the matter. 
After repeated but unproductive inquiries, petitioners' 
counsel was advised by a law clerk that he should seek 
relief in thig Court. After an unexplained period of 
futher delay, counsal filed their petition here on 
August 2J, 1974. 
Petitioners' motion arrived in my Chambers on the 
eve of the ccmnencement of classes throughout the State of 
Ohio. Indeed, some schools already had begun classes. The 
long delay in challenging this statute, and the time 
sequence in seeking relief here, prompted me to think that 
petitioners have the burden of clearly showing irreparable 
injury as a predicate to injunctive relief at this late date. 
3. District Judge Kinneary determined that all of the 
statute was valid except that portion which permitted the 
loan of items capable of diversion for religious purposes. 
Circuit Judge Peck concurred with that portion of the opinion 
validating the statute, and stated that he would uphold the 
statute in its entirety. District Judge Rubin, who would 
have invalidated the entire statute, dissented in part. 
4. The affidavit of petitioners' counsel indicates 
that he failed to inquire of the matter for nearly a month. 
It additionally indicates that he delayed some additional 
two weeks in seeking relief in this Court after having been 






Petitioners urge that they have an excellent chance 
of prevailing on the merits, asserting that the statute 
upheld in this case is virtually identical to one invalidated 
by a three-judge court in Marburfter v. Public Funds for 
Public Schools in New Jerse3, 35 F. Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), a decision that was affirme by this Court without opinion 
during the past Term. 94 S. Ct. 3163 (1974). Additionally, 
petitioners urge that this Court's decision in Lemon II, 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), necessitates an 
injunction In order to preserve the possibility of their 
eventual receipt of effective relief. 
It appears likely that at least four members of this 
Court will vote to note probable jurisdiction of this appeal. 
The state statutes in this case and in Meek v. Pittinger, 
374 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a6peal pendm, No. 73-1765 (SUlllller List 5, Sheet 1), upon whic it partia y relies, 
are quite similar to the N. J. statute invalidated in 
Marburger. 
Petitioners further argue that Lemon II places them 
in a position in which they can prevail on the merits and 
nonetheless be denied effective relief. This argument 
appears both to overstate the significance of Lemon II 
and to ignore the present posture of this case. The 
affidavit submitted as part of the State's opposition to 
petitioners' request indicates that some schools began 
classes on August 28 and that the remainder began on 
September 3. More importantly, the affidavit indicates 
that most school districts already have signed contracts 
with the teachers who are to serve in the non-public schools. 
Although the record is less clear on the question of the 
selection and purchase of materials, the same general 
pattern may well exist. It seems likely that the public 
and non-public schools will have arranged for the purchase 
and transfer of school materials in advance of the initiation 
of classes. 
In my view, these facts bear significantly on the 
propriety of issuing an injunction at this late date. 





that the school districts will be permitted to expend 
funds to satisfy obligations reasonably incurred in good 
faith reliance on the constitutionality of the statute. 
5. 
But since a substantial portion of the funds appear to 
have been committed prior to petitioners' request for 
relief in this Court, that harm already has been suffered. 
The issuance of an injunction at this time would not 
necessarily prevent the dissipation of State funds for 
the satisfaction of these obligations. On the other hand, 
petitioners' fear of receiving no relief appears to be 
misplaced. Lemon II suggests only that the school 
districts should be permitted to spend allocated funds to 
satisfy existing contractual obligations with private 
parties. It does not decide the question whether the 
State could continue to implement the program following 
an adverse decision in this Court. For example, nothing 
in Lemon II would preclude an order for the cessation of 
the teaching services program if the Court should so decide. 
These considerations persuaded me that petitioners 
have failed to demonstrate the degree of harm that should 
be required to justify the significant disruption that 
would result from enjoining the program at this time. 
As previously mentioned, the contested statute or a similar 
version has been on the books in Ohio since 1967. It 
was challenged unsuccessfully in the State courts in 1971, 
P.O.A.U. v. Essex, 28 Ohio St 2d 79 (1971), a case of 
which petitioners were aware.~/ In the present posture, 
I consider it advisable to permit the program to continug 
during the time required for resolution of the appeal. / 
L.F.P., Jr. 
5. The district court opinion indicates that petitioner 
Wolman had an action pending in state court during the pretrial 
stage of P.O.A.U. and that he attempted to consolidate the two 
cases. After the motion was denied, petitioner Wolman 
voluntarily dismissed his ease. No appeal was taken from the 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. 
6. Upon reaching my decision, I requested that the clerk 
immediately notify petitioners' counsel in order to enable them 
to refer the matter to another Justice if they so desired. On 
August 31 the motion was referred to Mr. Justice Douglas, who 
bas the matter under consideration. I am delivering a copy of 
this memorandum to his Chambers for his information. 
CC: Mr. Justice Douglas 
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WOLMA~, et al v. ESSEX, et al -- - / 1 / 
~ ~ ry ~ 
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· . f . · . d" d" .. ~, 'W~ ~ etition or inJunction pen ing isposition/ 
of appeal in this Court ~d-A....4~ 6') ~~ ~ ~ ~ I 
To MR. JUSTICE STEWART: ~,.p---~f-3,. 
In your absence, I was asked to enjoin the 
implementation of an Ohio statute providing State aid 
to non-public schools, pending the resolution of an appeal 
in this Court. Although the issue presented is difficult 
and my ultimate view may be that the statute is invalid, 
I denied the motion for an injunction at this time. For 
your information, I summarize my reasons for this action. 
The challenged statute provides a procedure whereby 
students of non-public schools gain access to certain 
materials and services provided students of public schools. 1 
State appropriated funds are allocated bi-annually to the 
local public school districts which, in turn, are authorized 
to spend them for materials or specified teaching and 
counseling services for students of non-public schools. 
~~~~ 
1. The instant statute, which has been in effect since 
December of 1971, i~bsta.ntially identical to a predecessor 
section adopted in 96 Several a ropriations have been 
adopted pursuant to statutes. Te atest, adopted on 
August 15, 1973, is the subject of t11is litigation. It 
totals $89,000,000 and appears to represent a substantial 







The statute requires that ~ateri_gls provided students 
of the non-public schools not exceed in cost or quality 
those given the public schools, and there are limitations 
against secular use. The public schoo l purcnases th~ 
m~ ains title to them. It then ~ends the 
materials to the non-public schools in response to the 
needs of those institutions. The materials vary from one 
school district to the next, and have .included such items 
as movje~j~ c!ors, weather forecasting charts, lunar 




Th~ tatute establishes a similar procedure for 
providing-::special instructors at State expense. The public ~ 
school employs tlieTnstructors and retains responsibiJity Yj 
for their supervision and control. The teachers are then 
sent into t e non-pu lic2 choo s upon reque§t. The 
teac1.uJ'rg services autn orizedtirlder tnis provision generally 
consist of services for handica ped students, including 
speech and hearing services, reme ia rea ing programs, 
and guidance, testing and counseling programs. 
In J J:!_l y of 1973, at petitioners request a three-judge 
court was convened to consider the constitutionality of the 
Ohio statute. An interlocutory injunction was issued 
restraining expenditures of money provided under a supplemental 
2. An @ffidavi_f:o f the State Department of Education's 
Director of F~ ndicates that the materials, like the• 
special teaching assistance, are to be used only in the 
instruction of the handicapped, and that the program is not 
de · e permi i asic education. Petitioners 
have not indicated otherwise. However, examination of the I 
list of materials indicates that man can be used in more 
ge~ _ins ~r~ction, and the statue provi es a ~e 
materia~ nase"rvices can be used for "the improvement 
of the educational and cultural status of disadvantaged 






appropriations bill signed in August of 1973. On July 
l, 1974 the court ~pheld the major portion of the statute, 3 
and petitioners then requested the court to enjoin 
implementa ' ion of the statute pending the resolution of 
an appeal in this Court. 
Petitioners allowed their reguest for relief in the 
district court to drift unresolved for some time before 
decidin9- to re~t · an in'unction from this Court. An affidavit submitted by counse o p itioners in icates 
that the District Court did not schedule a hearing on 
petitioners' motion and made no ruling on the matter. 
After repeated but unproductive inquiries, petitioners' 
counsel was advised by a law clerk that he should seek 
relief in thi~ Court. After an unexplained period of 
futher delay, counsel filed their petition here on 
August -2-fr, 1974. ::.___n:_ 
Petitioners' motion arrived in my Chambers on the 
eve of the commencement of classes throughout the State of 
Ohio. Indeed, some schools alread had begun classes. The 
long delay in chal ing tis statute, an 1e time 
sequence in seeking relief here, prompted me to think that 
.petitioners have the burden of clearly showing irreparable 
injury as a predicate to injunctive relief at this late date. 
3. District Judge Kinneary determined that all of the 
statute was valid except that portion which permitted the 
loan of items capable of diversion for religious purposes. 
Circuit Judge Peck concurred with that portion of the opinion 
validating the statute, and stated that he would uphold the 
statute in its entirety. District Judge Rubin, who would 
have invalidated the entire statute, dissented in part. 
4. The affidavit of petitioners' counsel indicates 
that he failed to inquire of the matter for nearly a month. 
It additionally indicates that he delayed some additional 
two weeks in seeking relief in this Court after having been 






Petitioners urge that they have an excellent chance 
of prevailing on the merits, asserting that the statute 
upheld in this case is virtually identical to one invalida ted 
by a three-judge court in Marburger v. Public Funds for 
Public Schools in New Jersea, 35 F. Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), 
a decision tha t was aff irme by this Court without opinion 
during the past Term. 94 S. Ct. 3163 (1974). Additional l y, 
petitioners urge that this Court's decision in Lemon II, 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), necessitates an 
inJunction in order to preserve the possibility of their 
eventual receipt of effective relief. 
It appears likely that at least four members of this 
Court will vote to note probable jurisdiction of this appeal. 
The state statutes in this case and in Meek v. Pittinger, 
374 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1974), ahpeaTpendiny , No. 73-1765 
(Summer List 5, Sheet 1), upon whic it partial y relies, 
are quite similar to the N. J. statute invalidated in 
Marburger. 
Petitioners further argue that Lemon II places them 
in a position in which they can prevail on the merits and 
nonetheless be denied effective relief. This argument 
appears ·both to overstate the significance of Lemon II 
,and to ignore the present posture of this case. The 
affidavit submitted as part of the State's opposition to 
petitioners! request indicates that some schools began 
classes on August 28 and that the remainder began on 
Sep em er . ore importantly, the affidavit indicates 
that most school districts alread have signed contracts 
with the teachers who are to serve in e non-pu ic schools. 
Although the record is less clear on the question of the 
selection and purchase of materials, the same general 
pattern may well exist. It seems likely that the public 
and non-public schools will have arranged for the purchase 
and transfer of school materials in advance of the initiation 
of classes. 
In my view, these facts bear significantly on the 
propriety of issuing an injunction at this late date. 





that the school districts will be permitted to expend 
funds to satisfy obligations reasonably incurred in good 
faith reliance on the constitutionality of the statute. 
5. 
But since a substantial portion of the funds appear to 
have been committed prior to petitioners' request for 
relief in this Court, that harm already has been suffered. 
The issuance of an injunction at this time would not 
necessarily prevent the dissipation of State funds for 
the satisfaction of these obligations. On the other hand, 
petitioners' fear of receiving no relief appears to be 
misplaced. Lemon II suggests only that the school 
districts should be permitted to spend allocated funds to 
satisfy existing contractual obligations with private 
parties. It does not decide the question whether the 
State could continue to implement the program following 
an adverse decision in this Court. For example, nothing 
in Lemon II would preclude an order for the cessation of 
the teaching services program if the Court should so decide. 
These considerations persuaded me that petitioners ~ 
have failed to demonstrate the degree of harm that should 
be required to justify the significant disruption that 
would result from enjoining the program at this time. 
As previously mentioned, the contested statute or a similar 
version has been on the books in Ohio since 1967. It 
--- ~,jas challenged unsuccessfully in the State courts in 1971, 
P.O.A.U. v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79 (1971), a case of 
which petitioners were aware. 5/ In the present posture, 
I consider it advisable to permit the program to continu~/ 
during the time required for resolution of the appeal. 
:;---- --:z , C,) / 




5. The district court opinion indicates that petitioner 
Wolman had an action pending in state court during the pretrial 
stage of P.O.A.U. and that he attempted to consolidate the two 
cases. After the motion was denied, petitioner Wolman 
voluntarily dismissed his case. No appeal was taken from the 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. 
6. Upon reaching my decision, I requested that the clerk 
immediately notify petitioners' counsel in order to enable them 
to refer the matter to another Justice if they so desired. On 
August 31 the motion was referred to Mr. Justice Douglas, who 
has the matter under consideration. I am delivering a copy of 
this memorandum to his Chambers for his information. 
CC: Mr. Justice Douglas 
LFP/gg 
-
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September 11, 197 4 
MEMORANDUIVI TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Wolman v. Essex 
The stay application in this case, directed to me 
as Circuit Justice, was in my absence referred to Lewis 
Powell. He denied the application. The application was sub-
sequently presented to Bill Douglas, who has advised us by 
memorandum today that he has asked that it be put on the 
October 7 Conference List. 
After denying the application, Lewis Powell sent 
me a memorandum summarizing the reasons for his decision. 
Now that the application is to be before the Conference, I en-
close herewith copies of Lewis' memorandum with the thought 
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WQ~, et al v. ESSEX, et al 
Petition for injunction pending disposition 
of appeal in this Court 
To MR. JUSTICE STEWART: 
In your absence, I was asked to enjoin the 
implementation of an Ohio statute providing State aid 
to non-public schools, pending the resolution of an appeal 
in this Court. Although the issue presented is difficult 
and my ultimate view may be that the statute is invalid, 
I denied the motion for an injunction at this time. For 
your information, I summarize my reasons for this action. 
, The challenged statute provides a procedure whereby 
students of non-public schools gain access to certain 
materials and services provided students of public schools. 1 
State appropriated funds are allocated bi-annually to the 
local public school districts which, in turn, are authorized 
to spend them for materials or specified teaching and 
counseling services for students of non-public schools. 
1. The instant statute, which has been in effect since 
December of 1971, is substantially identical to a predecessor 
section adopted in 1967. Several appropriations have been 
adopted pursuant to both statutes. The latest, adopted on 
August 15, 1973, is the subject of this litigation. It 
totals $89,000,000 and appears to represent a substantial 







The statute requires that materials provided student s 
of the non-public schools not exceed in cost or quality 
those given the public schools, and there are limitations 
against secular use. The public school purchases the 
materials and retains title to them. It then ~ends the 
materials to the non-public schools in response to the 
needs of those institutions. The materials vary from one 
school district to the next, and have included such items 
as movie projectors, weather forecasting charts, lunar 
terrain m2dels, fossil collections, and audio recording 
devices. 
The statute establishes a similar procedure for 
providing special instructors at State expense. The public 
school employs the instructors and retains responsibility 
for their supervision and control. The teachers are then 
sent into the non-public schools upon request. The 
teaching services authorized under this provision generally 
consist of services for handicapped students, including 
speech and hearing services, remedial reading programs, 
and guidance, testing and counseling programs. 
In July of 1973, at petitioners request a three-judge 
court was convened to consider the constitutionality of the 
Ohio statute. An interlocutory injunction was issued 
restraining expenditures of money provided under a supplemental 
2. An affidavit of the State Department of Education's 
Director of Finance indicates that the materials, like the 
special teaching assistance, are to be used only in the 
instruction of the handicapped, and that the program is not 
designed to permit aid to basic education. Petitioners 
have not indicated otherwise. However, examination of the 
list of materials indicates that many can be used in more 
general instruction, and the statute provides that the 
materials and services can be used for "the improvement 
of the educational and cultural status of disadvantaged 







appropriations bill signed in August of 1973. On July 
1, 1974 the court ~pheld the major portion of the statute, 3 
and petitioners then requested the court to enjoin 
implementation of the statute pending the resolution of 
an appeal in this Court. 
Petitioners allowed their request for relief in the 
district court to drift unresolved for some time before 
deciding to request · · an injunction from this Court. An 
affidavit submitted by counsel for petitioners indicates 
that the District Court did not schedule a hearing on 
petitioners' motion and made no ruling on the matter. 
After repeated but unproductive inquiries, petitioners' 
counsel was advised by a law clerk that he should seek 
relief in thi~ Court. After an unexplained period of 
futher delay, counsel filed their petition here on 
August -z·fr, 1974. 
~7 
Petitioners' motion arrived in my Chambers on the 
eve of the commencement of classes throughout the State of 
Ohio. Indeed, some schools already had begun classes. The 
long delay in challenging this statute, and the time 
sequence in seeking relief here, prompted me to think that 
-P~titioners have the burden of clearly showing irreparable 
injury as a predicate to injunctive relief at this late date. 
3. District Judge Kinneary determined that all of the 
statute was valid except that portion which permitted the 
loan of items capable of diversion for religious purposes. 
Circuit Judge Peck concurred with that portion of the opinion 
validating the statute, and stated that he would uphold the 
statute in its entirety. District Judge Rubin, who would 
have invalidated the entire statute, dissented in part. 
4. The affidavit of petitioners' counsel indicates 
that he failed to inquire of the matter for nearly a month. 
It additionally indicates that he delayed some additional 
two weeks in seeking relief in this Court after having been 






Petitioners urge that they have an excellent chance 
of prevailing on the merits, asserting that the statute 
upheld in this case is virtually identical to one invalidated 
by a three-judge court in Marbur§er v. Public Funds for 
Public Schools in New Jers e~ , 35 F. Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), 
a decision that was affi rme by this Court without opinion 
during the past Term. 94 S. Ct. 3163 (1974). Additionally, 
petitioners urge that this Court's decision in Lemon II, 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), necessitates an 
inJunction in order to preserve the possibility of their 
eventual receipt of effective relief. 
It appears likely that at least four members of this 
Court will vote to note probable jurisdiction of this appeal. 
The state statutes in this case and in Meek v. Pittinger, 
374 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1974), ahpeaTpendiny , No. 73-1765 
(Sunnner List 5, Sheet 1), upon whic it partial y relies, 
are quite similar to the N. J. statute invalidated in 
Marburger. 
Petitioners further argue that Lemon II places them 
in a position in which they can prevail on the merits and 
nonethel~ss be denied effective relief. This argument 
appears ·both to overstate the significance of Lemon II 
,and to ignore the present posture of this case. The 
affidavit submitted as part of the State's opposition to 
petitioners' request indicates that some schools began 
classes on August 28 and that the remainder began on 
September 3. More importantly, the affidavit indicates 
that most school districts already have signed contracts 
with the teachers who are to serve in the non-public schools. 
Although the record is less clear on the question of the 
selection and purchase of materials, the same general 
pattern may well exist. It seems likely that the public 
and non-public schools will have arranged for the purchase 
and transfer of school materials in advance of the initiation 
of classes. 
In my view, these facts bear significantly on the 
propriety of issuing an injunction at this late date. 





that the school districts will be permitted to expend 
funds to satisfy obligations reasonably incurred in good 
faith reliance on the constitutionality of the statute. 
5. 
But since a substantial portion of the funds appear to 
have been committed prior to petitioners' request for 
relief in this Court, that harm already has been suffered. 
The issuance of an injunction at this time would not 
necessarily prevent the dissipation of State funds for 
the satisfaction of these obligations. On the other hand, 
petitioners' fear of receiving no relief appears to be 
misplaced. Lemon II suggests only that the school 
districts should be permitted to spend allocated funds to 
satisfy existing contractual obligations with private 
parties. It does not decide the question whether the 
State could continue to implement the program following 
an adverse decision in this Court. For example, nothing 
in Lemon II would preclude an order for the cessation of 
the teaching services program if the Court should so decide. 
These considerations persuaded me that petitioners 
have failed to demonstrate the degree of harm that should 
be required to justify the significant disruption that 
would result from enjoining the program at this time. 
As previously mentioned, the contested statute or a similar 
version has been on the books in Ohio since 1967. It 
-· was challenged unsuccessfully in the State courts in 1971, 
P.O.A.U. v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79 (1971), a case of 
which petitioners were aware. 5/ In the present posture, 
I consider it advisable to permit the program to continu61 during the time required for resolution of the appeal. 
~ -- 7- r,I-< ( 
L. F. p. , Jr. /Z-
5. The district court opinion indicates that petitioner 
Wolman had an action pending in state court during the pretrial 
stage of P.O.A.U. and that he attempted to consolidate the two 
cases. After the motion was denied, petitioner Wolman 
voluntarily dismissed his case. No appeal was taken from the 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. 
6. Upon reaching my decision, I requested that the clerk 
immediately notify petitioners' counsel in order to enable them 
to refer the matter to another Justice if they so desired. On 
August 31 the motion was referred to Mr. Justice Douglas, who 
has the matter under consideration. I am delivering a copy of 
this memorandum to his Chambers for his information. 
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The notice of appeal was filed in the USDC on March 20, 1974 (and 
was timely, thus eliminating any jurisdictional defects). The appeal was 
docketed here on May 24, 1974. The appeal is therefore a few days non-
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This is a complex Establishment Clause case. Pennsylvania 
recently enacted legislation designed to assist private schools (the bulk 
of which are sectarian) and the children attending them in several w ays. 
Tax monies are to be spent for auxiliary services (remedial reading, 
guidance counseling, etc. ) to be provided by public employees on the 
premises of private schools. Children attending private schools are to be 
loaned textbooks approved for use in public schools. Instructional materials 
and instructional equipment are to be 11 loaned 11 to private schools. 
Appellants are state taxpayers, the NAACP, the ACLU, "Americans 
United, 11 and other groups devoted to the separation of church and state. 
Appellees are the state Secretary of Education and Grace M. Sloan (remembe r 
her?), the state Treasurer. Appellants brought this suit in a 3-judge USDC 
(ED Pa. ) seeking to enjoin the above legislation on Establishment Clause 
2/ 
grounds. Splitting two to one, the USDC rejected this attack and declined 
injunctive relief. Circuit Judge Gibbons of CA 3 wrote for the majority. 
DJ Higginbotham filed a SO-page separate opinion, concurring in small part 
and dissenting as to the rest. 
In a nutshell, the court upheld t ~ uxiliary services program, the 
extbook loan program, and t'he-1.nstructional materials "loan" program in -----their entirety. It upheld the instructional e uipment "loan" program insofa r 
2/ 
Appellants also relied on a Free Exercise theory, but this appear s 
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as the equipment provided the private school was by its very natu re not 
susceptible to sectarian use. To the extent that this program was capable 
of sectarian use (i.e., film projectors, which could be used for showing 
sectarian as well as nonsectarian films), it was unconstitutional. 
The dissenting judge agreed with the majority insofar as it held the 
equipment loan program invalid and the textbook loan program valid. He 
believed that in all other aspects the challenged legislation was unconstitution c: 
The USDC' s opinion and result is in many respects in conflict with 
that of the 3-judge USDC (D NJ) in Marburger v. Public Funds, No. 73-120 
(affirmed summarily by the Court at the end of OT 73). The New Jersey -
programs struck down in Marburger are quite similar to the Pennsylvania 
programs at issue here. The memo in that case should be reviewed before 
addressing this appeal. It should also be noted that the question whether 
public employees may offer auxiliary services on the premises of 
WA.$ 
sectarian schools __, noted (in the context of a federal statute) but not 
resolved in Wheeler v. Barrera, OT 73. 
1. The Statutes At Issue: Appellants challenge Pennsylvania Acts 
194 and 195, both passed in mid 1972 (see JS app 107a, et seq.). Both Acts 
have the standard statement of neutral purpose. Appellants do not really 
rely on the purpose test; their case rests primarily on the effect and 
entanglement aspects of current Establishment Clause doctrine. 
Act 194 addresses "auxiliary services. 11 These include: 
11 
••• guidance, counseling and testing services; 
psychjblogical services; services for exceptional 





- -- 4 -
speech and hearing services; services for the 
improvement of the educationally disadvantaged 
(such as, but not limited to, teaching English 
as a second lang uage), and such other secular, 
neutral, nonideological services as are of 
benefit to nonpublic school children and are 
presently or hereafter provided for public 
school children. . 11 
Auxiliary services are to be provided on private- school premises by public-
. -
school employees to children from kindergarten through the 12th grade. Only 
those private schools that offer the secular courses required by state law 
for all children are to benefit under this program. 
Act 195 sets up 3 programs - - textbook loans, instructional materials 
/ ' \) loans, and instructional equipment loans. l Textbooks must be those - It 1' 
acceptable for use in public schools. "Instructional materials" means: ------11
• • • books, periodicals, documents, pamphlets, 
photographs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic 
works, musical scores, maps, · charts, globes, 
sound recordings ... , slides ... , films ... , 
video tapes ... , etc. The term includes such 
other secular, neutral, nonideological materials 
as are of benefit to the instruction of nonpublic 
school children and are presently or hereafter 
provided for public school children . 11 
"Instructional equipment'' means equipment: 
"other than fix tures annexed to or forming 
part of the real estate, which is suitable 
for and to be used by children and/or teachers. 
The term includes but is not limited to projection 
equipment, recording equipment, laboratory 
equipment, and any other educational secular, 
neutral, nonideological equipment as may be of 
benefit to the instruction of nonpublic school 
children and are presently or hereafter 
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Textbooks are to be purchased by public school officials. They are 
then to be loaned free "upon individual request" to "all children ... who 
are enrolled in grades kindergarten through twelve of a nonpublic school 
wherein the requirements of the compulsory attendance provisions of 
[state law] may be met." 
Instructional materials and equipment are to be requested by nonpubli c 
school officials. Public school officials are then to purchase and distribute 
3/ 
the requested items to the nonpublic schools. Implementing guide lines 
(see JS app. at 42a-44a, 4 7a-48a) drafted by public school authorities 
indicate how the "loans" are to be carried out. Public officials are to 
develop plans for inventory control of materials and equipment, and the 
nonpublic schools must maintain their own running inventory. Moreover, 
"It is presumed that instructional materials on 
loan to nonpublic schools after a period of time 
will be lost, missing, obsolete or worn out." 
In addition, 
"After a period of 10 years [instructional equipment] 
shall be declared unserviceable and the disposal of 
such shall be at the discretion of the Secretary of 
Education. " 
2. Majority Opinion: The court dealt almost exclusively with the 
"effect" and "entanglement'' aspects of the challenged acts. _!!_ conclude d 
,-. 
3/ 
Dollar limits are set on the amount of textbooks, materials and 
equipment to be purchased. T!;iirty million dollars was appropriated by 
the legislature for these purposes for school-year 1972- 73. 't,hirty_,:f!ve 
million dollars was set aside for 1973- 74. It is not clear that all of this 






) that state expenditures will be held to violate the "effect test'' 
if: 
-- the p~yment is made directly to a sectarian 
school and is not effectively r"estricted to use - -by that school for secular purposes or 
- - the pa~~ is made directly to parents as 
a reimbursement for expenses incurred in 
sending children to a sectarian school and 
the payment is not effectively restricted to 
reimbursement for expenses for identifiable 
secular pupil activities or needs. 
On the other hand, state expenditures will pass the effect test if: 
-- although the payment is made directly to a 
parent, it reimburses the parent for an expense 
of a pupil activity clearly identifiable as secular, 
or 
-- although a property or service is furnished 
directly to a student, it is clearly identifiable 
as a secular prop-; rty or service, or 
although a payment or service is furnished 
directly to a secular institution, its use is 
effectively restricted to the secular activities 





The court then• · ;;sp the standards it thought governing with regard 
to entanglement. In sum (see JS app 2 la-26a, particularly 26a), excessiv e 
entanglement occurred only where government grants required it to be 
involved in the internal operations of the sectarian institution (in order to 
police the use of funds) "on a continuing basis." The court recognized the 
"caught-between-two-fires" problem of the effect and entanglement tests. 
But it believed that a path between the fires could be found. 
After explicating the above standards, the court turned to the 4 
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.. 
. ~ ·-.,. . -
a. The Auxiliary Services Program. The court noted that the 
services were to be provided to children directly and that they were limited 
to services provided to children in public schools. It noted the exteme 
need for remedial services in nonpublic schools, citing figures indicating 
the comparatively poor performance of nonpublic school children on speech, 
hearing, reading and other tests. The court believed that it was not 
feasible to send these children to public institutions for auxiliary services. 
To be. effective, the services had to be sent to the children. 
This program did not fail the effect test. Improved reading and 
hearing would assist children in absorbing sectarian doctrine, but that was 
not the principal purpose of the program. Rather, it was to develop their 
skills in secular courses. 
Nor was there excessive entanglement. This was for the most part 
because appellants had failed to establish as a fact that those who went 
to private schools to offer auxiliary services would become imbued with 
I 
religious doctrine. There would be no need for the state to monitor on an 
ongoing basis the performance of public employees in private schools. 
Pennsylvania for years has sent public health personnel into private schools .. 
This was not different. 
b. The Textbook Loan Program. This was constitutional under 
I 
Bd. of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). -~J 
c. The Instructional Mate rials Loan Program. By the nature of the 
materials themselves, there were no effect or entanglement problems. The 
materials could not be put to sectarian uses. Thus, there was no assistance -
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d. The Instructional Equipment Loan Program. Half of this program 
survived; half did not. Some of the equipment could easily be diverted to - / 
religious purposes (~, movie projectors). Therefore, it would either 
assist religion directly or the steps necessary to prevent this result would 
produce entanglement. Other equipment, such as laboratory or gymnasium 
4/ 
equipment, could only be used for secular purposes. Such equipment was 
"severable" and permissible. 
3. Dissenting opinion: Judge Higginbothan-i depicted the majority as 
exalting form over substance. Given the breakdown of private schools in the 
+\\.~•~-
state, what was at issue in reality was a 3 1¢ disguised subsidy to the 
Catholic Church. The textbook loan program was barely constitutional, 
although the question was quite doubtful -- the program envisioned too much 
5/ 
contact between public and private school officials. All other programs 
were unconstitutional. 
4/ 
It was possible to imagine the storing of holy water in a chemistry 
laboratory beaker, but the court saw no need to tarry long with such a 
prospect. 
5 / • 
- The statute says that loan requests are to come from indiv~duals. 
Implementing guidelines reveal, however, that requests for textbooks are 
really to originate with private school officials. Moreover, textbooks "on 
loan" to nonpublic schools are presumed to be obsolete after a period of time. 
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The auxiliary services program was bad on entanglement grounds. 
It is essential to monitor how public employees perform in a sectarian 
environment, yet the surveillance required was itself unconstitutional. 
Guidance counsellors presented a particularly difficult problem. 
The materials and equipment programs were bad on effect grounds. 
They constitute a substantial monetary benefit to sectarian schools. It 
makes no difference that the effect was not primarily to aid religion. 
4. Contentions: Appellants rely on Marburger, supra. Their 
entire argument is that the effect test is violated or that measures 
necessary to control "effect" lead inexorabLy to entanglement. Appellee s 
make no points not made by the majority at USDC. 
5. Discussion: In light of Marburger, supra, a note appears 
inescapable. The auxiliary services program struck down in Marburger 
~- was n~ ly_jg.e.£!.ical to the program at issue here. Marburger also dealt -
with the transmittal of instructional equipment to sectarian schools. The 
USDC in that case described the equipment program as a "loan in name only , " 
since the· equipment was transferred to private schools throughout the 
useful life of those as sets. The same thing may be true he re - - both 
,--
materials and equipment will be given to the schools until obsolete. There 
appears to be no explicit provision for recapture by state officials. Thus, 
the "loan 11 concept may be a pretext. 
Putting aside Marburger, there is a serious question whether the -
USDC' s approach in this case is consistent with the standards enunciated in, 
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Burger, White, Rehnquist, diss. ), particularly with that portion of Nygui s t 
devoted to entanglement. Id. , at 794- 798. The large amounts of money 
potentially if not actually involved raises significant effect and enta nglement 
(particularly political divisiveness) questions. 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
Joel Klein 
DATE: February 17, 1975 
No. 73-1765 Meek v. Pittenger 
er~ ,~sz,.,'L c;~ • t-f ,"a.,~~ 
This is another case in the ongoing saga between state 
legislatures and this Court as to which forms of state aid 
to sectarian schools can pass constitutional muster. Before 
addressing the four programs at issue, there are a few 
preliminary matters that I would like to address. 
1. Appellees dispute appellant~ contention that the 
record demonstrates that church-run and controlled schools 
with restrictive admission and hiring policies receive aid 
under the Pennsylvania statutes at issue. This appears to 
be a lame effort to analogize this case to the sectarian 
college cases, Tilton v. Richardson and Hunt v. McNair, 
where the Court has recognized that the religious nature of 
the institutions involved is very different from the religious 
nature of sectarian elementary and secondary schools. 
I find appellee's efforts unpersuasive for several 
reasons. The Pennsylvania statutes on their face allow ~ 
aid to all private schools, 75% of which are, as the ---... 
interrogatories a cknowledge, Catholic Diocesan schools. 
J.S. at 63a. Moreover, appellants introduced testimony 
r-0"'--' 
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state gives aid to all private schools, irrespective of 
religious involvement. App. at 45-47. Nor do appellees 
dispute that religious schools with restrictive practices 
receive such aid. Hence their claim boils down to the fact 
that appellants did not specifically introduce evidence showing 
that any individual recipient of this aid was a restrictive 
religious school . But this formal failure of proof, if 
failure it was, should not be dispositive in view of the plain 
realities of the Pennsylvania situation and the history of 
Pennsylvania's litigation in this Court i~ 1_emon v. Kurtzman 
Co\l\ s \t,Ltl...v 
and Sloan v. Lemon. Hence, I would h<f=4 this case as resting 
on the factual predicates outlined by appellants on page 4 
of their brief. 
2. Appellants urge the Court to overrule Board of 
Education 
to pupils 
v. Allen, the case that upheld text book loans 
a.l,L, . ~ c;., ru-~ . 
attending~priJ,ate schools7 I can understand why 
appellants make this argument. Prior to Allen, the 
constitutional 11 \KA o '' had been marked by Justice Black 
in the school transportation case, Everson v. Board of 
Education. Had the Court remained content with the line 
drawn in Everson, there is no doubt that the boundaries would 
would be rrruch more clearly· delineated and the repeated 
efforts of the states to find a "magic formula" to enable 
~ 
them to give aid to parochial schools would hav e been much 
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in Allen precisely because the balance struck in Allen often 
requires the Court to draw distinctions that are sometimes 
too finely attenuated for sound constitutional adjudication. 
As you noted in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
while citing Justice Black's Allen dissent with approval, 
"the ingenious plans for channeling state aid to secterian 
schools that periodically reach this Court abundantly support 
the wisdom of Mr. Justice Black's prophecy." 
Although I think there is much wisdom in overruling 
Allen, I nevertheless am persuaded that there are stronger 
reasons for not doing so. While you were not a member of 
the Court at the time Allen was decided, you have cited and 
relied upon it in your subsequent opinions. Moreover, there 
is always the great reluctance to overrule a precedent of 
such recent vitange, particularly where, as here, it appears 
that the Court could live quite comfortably with Allen. 
3. Given Allen, it would seem that the textbook loan 
p~ovision of Act 195 satisfies constitutional requirements. 
It is true, as appellant's argue and as the dissenting judge 
below noted, that the administrative involvement between the 
state and the religious schools is somewhat greater here 
5ee :f . S. , ~, '1--- '11 . 
than it was in Allen. ( Indeed, one is tempted to speculate, 
as did the dissente~i"' below, that Pennsylvania's procedural 
approach suggests that the textbook loans are "nothing more 







principally~ nonpublic schools which are fundamentally 
and preponderantly church related." J.S. at 75a. Nevertheless, 
even the dissent ultimately acquiesced in upholding the 
textbook loan provision, and it seems to me that the greater 
administrative involvement in this case is primarily a matter 
of convenience and not a significant substantive distinction. 
Thus, I would be inclined to allow this provision on the basis 
of Allen, noting carefully that the heart of the constitutional 
o-1--il 
ruling rests on the fact that the loan is toApupils, not to 
sectarian schools. Moreover, the loan of textbooks, as 
distinguished from the grants and tax credits at issue in 
Nyquist, is hardly, in any real sense, an "incentive to 
parents to send their children to sectarian schools." 
4. Each of the remaining three programs, in my view, 
take a distinct step beyond Allen and would require expansion 
of prior case law if they are to be upheld. Each program -
auxiliary services, instructional materials, and instructional 
equipment - invol;es direct ai,:l by the state to sectarian 
schools. 
,, ~ 
The form ~of granting aid directly to pupils, as 
.::::----
distinguished from religious institutions, which was deemed 
so relevant in Allen and Everson would be abandoned if any 
of these three programs are allowed to stand. While I agree 
with your holding in Nyquist that the mere fact tha t aid is 
given to the pupils rather than the school is not determinative 
I 
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follows: that is, that the mere fact that the aid is given 
directly to the sectarian school should not be dispositive 
of the constitutional issue. As you state in Nyquist, quoting 
Justice Black, it is well-settled that "no tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they be called, or 
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 
(Emphasis mine). There is no doubt that many of the private 
schools receiving aid in Pennsylvania are created to teach 
and inculcate reli ion, and I do not think tax dollars should 
go to such· ons even if they serve some non-sectarian 
function ~. Indeed, if this principle is not embraced in this 
case, the Court will be creating a loophole that could allow 
for massive state support of sectarian schools. Nor do I 
think that I am engaging in hyperbole by suggesting this. 
a 
The same principle that allows the state to send/guidance 
counsellor or remedial reading teacher to work in a sectarian 
school would also allow the state to send a math teacher or 
any other teacher to teach non-religious courses in sectarian 
schools. Indeed, the state might even go so far as to hire 
teachers who once taught lay subjects at sectarian schools 
and then deploy them to teach at these same schools. This 
is precisely what happened in this case. In answer to an 
interrogatory, appellees acknowledged that there are people 






were previously employed by nonpublic schools to which they 
are [presently] assigned." Appellants' Brief at 9, quoting 
from the record. Thus, I would urge you to reject any 
program of direct aid to sectarian schools as violative of 
the Establishment Clause. 
6. 
5. Assuming, however, that you are unwilling to subscribe 
to such a broad principle, I will also include a more 
particularistic analysis of these three programs: 
A. Auxiliary Services This, to me, is the most 
troubling of the three programs. Somehow the '"' O.V\, VV'-"'--t-2} 
of materials and equipment marks a distinction from teachers 
and counselors that I find important. Under this program 
the state hires guidance counse ] ors, psychologists, remedial 
reading teachers, teachers for the gifted, etc., and sends 
them to work in private schools. I do not see how at least 
some of these people can avoid getting intertwined in religious 
matters. How, for example, can a guidance counse] or avoid 
counseling a young pupil on matters bearing on religion when 
the pupil raises the issue. Suppose the pupil asks whether 
it is better for him to go to a public or parochial high 
school. Similarly, what does a psychologist say when a Catholic 
youth claims that he feels guilty because he has desires 
that are incompatible with church doctrine? These problems 
seem less apparent with respect to remedial reading teachers 
or other purely academic types but I still think that teachers 





instructors and I do not think the state can categorize them 
into "secular" pedagogues and thereby negate the realities 
of their roles as adviers, role-models and friends. This 
view, to a large extent, underlies the Court's reasoning 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, although concededly there the teachers 
were hired by the sectarian schools. 
I also note that appellants ~uggest that if the state 
services for pupils in religious 
wants to set up auxiliary/schools it should require the pupils 
to come to public schools. This seems to me to be a proper 
accommodation of the interests a t sta~e. Admittedly, it 
 i"-',.....,.._, 
is, to some degree, more a matter of ,m~ substance, 
but I think that form is perhaps uniquely appropriate in this 
area. Such an accommodation would mirror the Court's holdings 
in the "release-time" cases dealing with public school 
students. In those cases, the Court required public school 
students to leave the public schools and go to religious 
institutions to receive religious training. Mccollum v. 
Board of Education; Engel v. Vitale. 
B. Instructional Materials - Absent the fact that these 
materials are supplied directly to the schools rather than 
t,1{ 4 r 
~~·. 
k, !),<AA"~! the pupils, analysis of these materials is akin to the 
~ . I analysis of textbooks involved in Allen. Typically the 
·-: +-ti 
~ content of the materials - ~-~-, ~ harts/ - can readily 
~ be examined and determined to be secular. And while one 
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to religious purposes, I find the speculation too fanciful. 
Thus, if you are willing to sustain direct state aid to 
religious schools, this form of aid seems least objectionable. --I note, however, that according to the dissenting judge in 
the district court below, the magnitude of the aid involved 
in "loaning" these materials is substantially greater than 
that involved in loaning textbooks. J.S. at 87a. 
C. Instructional Equipment - Initially Pennsylvania 
has authorized the loan of a great deal of equipment including 
items such as recorders, audio-visual aids, and the like. 
The district court, however, unanimously invalidated the 
provision. insofar as it allowed for materials that could 
easily be diverted to religious use. Pennsylvania then 
revised its regulation and now attempts to limit the equip-
--. 
ment to materials that may be used only for secular purposes 
such ~ (i~borat~ ui~ !-J --
~c:s c:::::..-
like. [The revised regulation is reprinted at pages 33-34 -of appellants' brief.] Even among the remaining equipment, 
however, at least some of it - e.g_., storage cabinets, carts, 
and industrial arts materials - may readily be used for 
religious purposes. In any event it would require too nruch 
~ st~-!e-e~tan~ment, Lemon v. Kurtzman, to insure, for example, 
that religious materials were not kept in state-provided 
storage files or transported in state-provided carts. Thus, 
if this provision is to be upheld at all one must distinguish 
between that equipment - e .g_., microscopes - which is·\~ 
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6. One other factor that is relevant to all of these 
programs is the "potential divisiveness" you found relevant 
in Nyquist. Indeed, the fact is more pertinent here since 
all of these programs require annual refunding and involve 
significant sums of money. In the first year of these 
enactments, $ 31 million was appropriated; in the second 
year, 
There 
the appropriation was increased to more than $35 million. 
. 1· 1 d b h h · · ~ 11 1~~& \-o is itt e out tat sue appropriations wi ( increase 
and, moreover, that if this Court allows these programs 
the states will devise even more elaborate forms by which 
to grant aid to sectarian schools. This is yet another 
reason for sustaining my view that direct aid to parochial 
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This memorandum summarizes the type of "aid" before 
the Court in the following "Establishment" cases: 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
~-\-~ 
~;;; 
Public elementary and secondary schools in New York. 
Three distinct financial aid programs: 
(i) d~~ ect m£ney §{ants to nonpublic schools for 
"maintenance and repair of ••. school facilities and 
equipment to insure the health, welfare and safet~y of 
\P ~ d'-J .. ;' 143 
~4,,'e 
/.J.L-~ H,. • ...._ ~ 4-<.. e::_. ~ 
enrolled pupils". ~'4.4&.,...A.t' ...... • _ _,_ 4,,U---l,•~ . :,..,.,,, A_,_, 
-~'"'°~~ (ii) a tuition grant program providing reimbursements 
-
of $50 for each grade school child and $100 for each high 
school child payable directly to low income parents, . 
without any restriction on use. ~ .::,>--4~¥~ 
' ~ ~~ ( · · IT 1 · d b f. t C.-• · ~ 1.1..LJ a comp 1.cate tax ene 1. program. ~ .~..A. 
~.~ 
Comment: We reasoned, with respect to the direct tuition 
grant , that there was no difference in principle between 
giving it to the parent to reimburse him for tuition, and 
paying it school. 
Everson< 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
Parents of public as well as parochial school children 




- • 2. 
bus fare program was analogous to the provision of municipal 
services such as police, fire, highways and sidewalks for 
parochial schools. 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
New York law provided secular textbooks for all children 
in grades 7 through 12 attending public and nonpublic schools. 
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
Construction grants to colleges and universi t ies limited 
to clearly secular purposes, the grants being made available 
for both public and nonpublic institutions of higher learning. 
.; · j ·• • _ , . ... 
lfp/ss 2/19/75 • • 
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JK/gg L-l.':J- 1~ - -
MEMORANDUM 
(Supplemental Memorandum) 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Joel Klein DATE: February 19, 1975 
No. 73-1765, Meek v. Pittinger 
This memo is an analysis of the several forms of state 
aid at iss ue in this case as compared with the types of state 
aid at is sue in Marburger,* which was affirmed SlllIIIIlarily by 
Court. ~"2. -J- -~.,.f T:!1f~ ~,18e.,1 ?'~ 
1 . .....,The first sec ion of th;;::;-J:1sey statute 
t he 
involved in Marburger provided for direct grants of up to 
$10 for grade school and $20 for high school to the parents 
of nonpublic school children for "money spent to purchase 
'secular, nonideological textbooks, instructional materials 
and supplies.'" In effect, as elaborated by the regulations 
adopted by New Jersey, this provision allows a cash reimburse-
ment to the parents of private school students who must purchas e 
text books, school supplies - ~-~·, pencils, industrial arts 
equipment, etc. - and the like. Essentially, from what I can 
discern from t he district court opinion in Marburger, this 
~~~ 
grant goes only to defray the cost of those items t~ the 
private schools bill their students , ~ The district court 
* The full text of the statutes in Marburger is 







invalidated the provisionJ distinguishing Allen on the basis 
of t he f act that, in New Jersey, public school students 
do not purchase their textbooks but rather are loaned textbooks 
for t he time that they are taking a particular course. 
In the present case Pennsylvania loans testbooks 
.J 
to private schools, requiring the parents of private school 
pupils to request such a loan. On its face, this statu te 
would appear distinguishable from the New Jersey statute 
~ ?a.-
at issue in Marburger since the state is only loaning the 
l'l 
books to the pupils, and not purchasing them for the pupils. 
This distinction is undercut somewhat, as the dissenting 
judge in this case indicates, by the fact that the net effect 
of Pennsylvania's textbook loan is to reduce the price paid by 
parents of private school children for each term's textbooks. 
Nevertheless, there is some distinction between buying textbooks 
for a student --
-/( 
and paying for the student's use of those 
textbooks for a term. In this regard, the Pennsylvania statute 
is more akin to Allen and I would assume could be upheld on that 
basis. 
* The New Jersey statute in Ma rburger speaks of 
"purchase" and the opinion relies on that term, contrasting 
it to the loan made to public' school students. If, in fact, 
New Jersey only "purchased" the cost of using a t ext book for 







2. The second statute in Marburger authorized the 
state connnissioner to use public funds to pay for the loan of 
auxiliary services, and instructional materials and equipment 
requested by private schools. This statute is identical 
to the applicable parts of the Pennsylvania statutes. It 
requires that the auxiliary services - !:·~·, counseling, 
remedial reading, and the like - be provided by state employed 
and certified personnel. It also includes materials and 
equipment_ that are functionally the same as those provided 
~ - .... -----------------
by Pennsylvania. One distinction1perhaps worthy of mention, 
is the equipment in New Jersey included equipment such as 
televisions, projectors, etc., whereas the district court 
in this case attempted to narrow the Pennsylvania statute 
so as to limit it to equipment that could only be used for 
secular purposes. On balance, though, I think this factor 
is of no particular significance since the other two programs -
auxiliary services and instructional materials - were identical 






IBA:58-63. Reimbursement of parents for purchase of secular, nonldeolo 1 textbooks, Instructional materlals and suppllea II cat 
The commissioner shall, upon authorization by the hoard ~~-,e parcn 
for money spent during the current school year to purchase sec~l:I 
i!Tcotog1cai fexlt>ooks, Instructional materials and supplies. ' n. 
a. Subject"tothe limitations of aYailable appropriations and requlremt'lltg 
set forth in this section, the amount of reimbursement for textbooks, materials 
and supplies for each school year shall not exceed: 
(1) For eacb student attending grades kindergarten through 8, the sum of 
$10.00. 
(2) For each student attending grades O through 12, the sum of $20.00. 
b. Before the commissioner may Issue funds proYlded for under this sec-
tion, he shall be In receipt of: 
(1) A verified statement from each nonpublic school attended by students 
whose parents are seeking reimbursement hereunder, certifying that said 
students were enrolled as of Septemlfer 30 of the current school year, gh·ing 
the name and address of the parents of said students and listing the secular, 
nonideological textbooks used in said nonpublic schools for the current school 
year. 
(2) A verified statement, certifying that the parent has expended on secular, 
nonldeological textbooks, instructional materials and supplies, not less than 
the amount for which application is made. 
c. Textbooks, the cost of which are reimbursable under this act, shall mean 
any teiffiooks which are In use or haYe been used within ;; years of September 
15 of the year for· which ~lmrsement is sought, In any public school 1n the 
State or which are approYed by the commissioner ascompiying wfffi the p'ro-
visions and purposes of this act. 
d. In no event may reimbursement t:> a parent under this section for a 
student be granted or allowed for any expenditure by the parent for other 
than secular, nonideolog-ical textbooks, instructional material, and supplies. \ 
e. Payment under this section shall be made to parents commencing De-
cember 31, 1971 or as !':00n thereafter as possible and NoYember 30 in each 
following year, or as soon thereafter as possible. 
L.1971, c. 336, § 5, eff. Dec. 7, 1971. 
Library references 
Schools and School Districts e::>3. 
C .J.S. Schools and School Districts § 5. 
IBA:58-64. Supplies, Instructional materials, etc. for nonpublic schools 
In addition to the provisions of section 5 above,1 the commissioner shall pro-
(,)
,·ide, w~ the limits of the funds made arnilable by the Legislature, such 
~e!..:r,r'structional m~rials, equipment and auxiliary services as are re-
quested by ffic nonpulihc school. The board shall adopt gmdelines and pro-
cedures under which such supplies, instructional materials, equipment and 
auxiliary sen ·ices shall be provided. · Ownership of the nonconsumable sup-
plies and instructional matC'rials and equipment proYided pursuant to this 
act shall remain In the State Department of Education. 
L.1971, c. 336, § 6, eff. Dec. 7, 1971. 
1 Section 18A :58-63. 
Library references 
Schools and School Districts e::>75. 
C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 
§ 265 et seq. 
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JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
• • ~upt tnte <!):o url cf tfyt 'Jfuriteh ~tait,s-
~M frin.gtctt. l9. <!):. ZOffe~.;l 
February 24, 1975 
RE: No. 73-1765 Meek v. Pittinger 
Dear Chief: 
V 
I've decided that I should not assign the op1n1on in the 
above. I'm alone in my conference vote that the text books 
statute should fal l with the statutes on services, etc. Thus 
on text books, the conference vote is 6 - 1; however Thurgood 
votes (if he does participate) there remains a ma jority agains t 
my view. 
Thurgood's vote on services, etc. could make a difference 
I agree . If he agrees with Potter, Lewis, Harry and me , the 
majority will be 5 - 3 on that question. If he votes with you, 
Byron and Bill Rehnquist, there wou ld be an affirma nce by a 
4 - 4 vote. Either result suggests that I ought not assign the 
opinion. 
The Chief Justice 
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This case requires us to determine once again whether a 
state law providing assistance to nonpublic, church-
related, elementary and secondary schools is constitu-
tional under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, mad~ applicable to the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvani,a, 319 U.S. 
105, 109; Cantwell v. Cor,,necticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303. 
I ~,,.~ 
With the stated purpose of assuring that every school- "'1A _ - , -i:j-
child in the Commonwealth will equitably share in the ""7 f • -N 1 
benefits of auxiliary services, textbooks, and instructional -
material provided free of charge to children attending fJ _ _ _. /J J1 J. ~ . 
public schools/ the Pennsylvania General Assembly in J ~~ 
1972 added Acts 194 and 195, July 12, 1972, Pa. Stat. Tit.~ 
24, § 9-972, to the Pennsylvania Public School Code of .Q-C.. ~ ) 
' 1949, Pa. Stat . Tit. 24, §§ 1- 101 to 27- 2702. 
1 
~ 
1 See Act 194, § 1 (a), .Pa. Stat. Tit. 24, § 9-972 (a) ; Act 195, I,,,(,, ~ LY1,~ ..... ..a._ _ 
§ 1 (a ), Pa. Stat. Tit . 24, § 9-972 (a). - ,----
~ /L,,,-. .. ~ 1-o 
~>~4 
~(-t-.et 
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Act 194 authorizes the Commonwealth to provide "aux-
iliary services" to all children enrolled in nonpublic ele-
mentary and secondary schools meeting Pennsylvania's 
compulsory attendance requirements. 2 "Auxiliary serv-
2 Act 194 provides: 
"(a) Legislative Finding; Declaration of Policy. The welfare of 
the Commonwealth requires that the present and future generations 
of school age children be assured ample opportunity to develop to 
the fullest their intellectual capacities. To further this objective, 
the Commonwealth provides, through tax funds of the Common-
wealth, auxiliary services free of charge to children attending public 
schools within the Commonwealth. Approximately one quarter of 
all children in the Commonwealth, in compliance with the compulsory 
attendance provisions of this act, attend nonpublic schools. Although 
their parents are taxpayers of the Commonwealth, these children do 
not receive auxiliary services from the Commonwealth. It is the 
intent of the General Assembly by this enactment to assure the 
providing of such auxiliary services in such a manner that every 
school child in the Commonwealth will equitably share in the benefits 
thereof. 
"(b) Definitions. The following terms, whenever used or referred 
to in this section, shall have the following meanings, except in those 
circumstances where t.he context clearly indicates otherwise: 
"'Nonpublic school' means any school, other than a public school · 
within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, wherein a resident of 
the Commonwealth may legally fulfill the compulsory school attend-
ance requirements of this act and which meet the requirements of 
Title VI of .the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-352) . 
"'Auxiliary services' means guidance, counseling and testing serv-
ices; psychological services; services for exceptional children; re-
medial and therapeutic $ervices; speech and hearing services; services 
for the improvement of the educationally disadvantaged (such as, 
but not limited to, teaching English as a second language) , and 
such other secular, neutral, non-ideological services as are of benefit 
to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided 
for public school children of the Commonwealth. 
" ( c) Provision of Services. Pursuant to rules and regulations 
established by the secretary, each intermediate unit shall provide 
auxiliary services to all children who are enrolled in grades kinder-
garten through twelve in nonpublic schools wherein the requirements 
of the compulsory attendance provisions of this act may be met and 
-
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3 
ices" include counseling, testing, and psychological serv-
ices, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and related 
services for exceptional children, for remedial students, 
and for the educationally disadvantaged, "and such other 
secular, neutral, non-ideological services as are of benefit 
to nonpublic schoolchildren and are presently or hereafter 
provided for public schoolchiidren of the Commonwealth." 
Act 194 specifies that the teaching and services are to be 
provided in the nonpublic schools themselves by personnel 
drawn from the appropriate "intermediate unit," part of 
the public school system of the Commonwealth estab-
lished to provide special services to local school districts. 
See Pa. Stat. Tit. 24, §§ 9-951 to 9-971 . 
Act 195 authorizes the State Secretary of Education, 
either directly or through the intermediate units, to lend -textbooks without charge to children attending nonpublic 
elemeiita"ry and seconaary schools that meet the Common-
wealth's compulsory attendance requirements.3 The 
which are located within the area served by the intermediate unit, 
such auxiliary services to be provided in their respective schools. 
The secretary shall each year apportion to each intermediate unit an 
amount equal to the cost of providing such services but in no case 
shall the amount apportioned be in excess of thirty dollars ($30) 
per pupil enrolled in nonpublic schools within the area served by the 
intP,rmediate unit." 
The Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949 provides that the 
requirements of the compulsory attendance law may be met at a 
nonpublic school so long as "the subjects and activities prescribed 
by the standards of the State Board of Education are taught in the 
English language." Pa . Stat. Tit. 24, § 13- 1327. 
3 The sections of Act 195 relating to the loan of textbooks provide : 
"(b) Definitions. . . . . 'Textbooks' means books, reusable work-
books, or manuals, whether bound or in looseleaf form, intended for 
use as a principal source of study material for a given class or group 
of students, a copy of which is expected to be available for the in-
dividual use of each pupil in such class or group. Such textbooks 
shall be textbooks which are acceptable for use in any public, ele-
mentary, or secondary school of the Commonwealth. 
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books that may be lent are limited to those "which are / 
acceptable for use in any public, elementary, or secondary 
school of the Commonwealth." 
Act 195 also authorizes the Secretary of Education, 
pursuant to requests from the appropriate nonpublic 
school officials, to lend directly to the nonpublic schools 
"instructional materials ar.d equipment, useful to the 
education" of nonpublic schoolchildren! "Instructional 
through the intermediate units, shall have the power and duty to 
purchase textbooks and, upon individual request, to loan them to all 
children residing in the Commonwealth who are enrolled in grades 
kindergarten through twelve of a nonpublic school wherein the re-
quirements of the compulsory attendance provisions of this act may 
be met. Such textbooks shall be loaned free to such r.hildren sub-
ject to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the 
Secretary of Education. 
" (d) Purchase of Books. The Secretary shall not be required to 
purchase or otherwise acquire textbooks, pursuant to this section, 
the total cost of which, in any school year, shall exceed an amount 
equal to ten dollars ($10) multiplied by the number of children 
residing in the Commonwealth who on the first day of October of 
such school year are enrolled in grades kindergarten through twelve 
of a. nonpublic school within the Commonwealth in which the re-
quirements of the compulsory attendance provisions of this act may 
be met." 
4 The sections of Act 195 relating to the direct loan of instructional 
material and equipment provide: 
" (b) Definitions. . . . 'Instructional equipment' means instructional 
equipment, other than fixtures annexed to and forming part of the 
real estate, which is suitable for and to be used by children and/or 
teachers. The term includes but is not limited to projection equip-
ment, recording equipment, laboratory equipment, and any other 
educational secular, neutral, non-ideological equipment as may be of 
benefit to the instruction of nonpublic school children and are pres-
ently or hereaiter provided for public school children of the 
Commonwealth. 
" 'Instructional materials' means books, periodicals, documents~ 
pamphlets, photographs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic works, 
musical scores, maps, charts, globes, sound recordings, including but 
not limited to those on discs and tapes, processed slides, transparen-
-
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materials" are defined to include periodicals, photographs, 
maps, charts, sound recordings, films, "or any other 
printed and published materials of a similar nature." 
"Instructional equipment," as defined by the Act, includes 
projection equipment, recording equipment, and labora-
tory equipment. 
On February 7, 1973, three individuals and four organi-
zations 5 filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
cies, films, filmstrips, kinescopes, and video tapes, or any other printed 
and published materials of a similar nature made by any method now 
developed or hereafter to be developed. The term includes such 
other secular, neutral, non-ideological materials as are of benefit to 
the instruction of nonpublic school children and are presently or here-
after provided for public school children of the Commonwealth. 
0 0 ct e • 
" ( e) Purchase of Instructional Materials and Equipment. Pursu-
ant to requests. from the appropriate nonpublic school official on be-
half of nonpublic school pupils, the Secretary of Education shall 
have the power and duty to purchase directly, or through the inter-
mediate units, or otherwise acquire, and to loan to such nonpublic 
schools, instructional materials and equipment, useful to the educa-
tion of such children, the total cost of which, in any school year, 
shall be an amount equal to but not more than twenty-five dollars 
($25) multiplied by the number of children residing in the Common-
wealth who on the first day of October of such school year, are en-
rolled in grades kindergarten through twelve of a nonpublic school in 
which the requirements of the compulsory attendance provisions of 
this act may be met." 
.o; The individual plaintiffs are Sylvia Meek, Bertha D. Myers, and 
Charles A. Weatherley ; all are resident taxpayers of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania. The organizational plaintiffs are the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, the Pennsylvania Jewish Community Rela-
tions Council, and Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State; each group has members who are taxpayers of Pennsylvania. 
Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 643. The District Court prop-
erly concluded that both the individual and the organizational plain-
tiffs had standing to bring this challenge to Acts 194 and 195. Id., 
at 647; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.' S. 83; Sierra Club v. Morton, 
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the consti-
tutionality of Act 194 and Act 195, and requesting an in-
junction prohibiting the expenditure of any funds under 
either statute. The complaint alleged that each Act "is 
a law respecting an establishment of religion in violation 
of the First Amendment" because each Act "authorizes 
and directs payments to or 11se of books, materials and 
equipment in schools which (1) are controlled by churches 
or religious organizations, (2) have as their purpose the 
teaching, propagation and promotion of a particular re-
ligious faith , (3) conduct their operations, curriculums 
and programs to fulfill that purpose, ( 4) impose religious 
restrictions on admissions, ( 5) require attendance at in-
struction in theology and religious doctrine, (6) require 
attendance at or participation in religious worship, (7) are 
an integral part of the religious mission of the sponsoring 
church, (8) have as a substantial or dominant purpose the 
inculcation of religious values, (9) impose religious re-
strictions on faculty appointments, and ( 10) impose re-
ligious restrictions on what the faculty may teach." The 
Secretary of Education and the Treasurer of the Com-
. monwealth were named as the defendants.6 
A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 
U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284. After an evidentiary hearing,. 
~ The original defendants were .John C. Pittenger, Secretary of 
Education of Pennsylvania, and Grace M. Sloan, Treasurer of Penn-
sylvania. A number of additional parties were permitted by the-
District Court to intervene as defendants. Some of the individual 
intervenors are parents of children attending nonpublic, nonsectarian 
schools, who receive benefits under the challenged Acts either di-
rectly or through their schools; others are the parents of children 
attending nonpublic, church-related schocls, who are benefited di-
rectly or indirectly by the Acts. One organizational intervenor is 
an association of nonpublic, nonsectarian schools; the other organi-
zational intervenor is a nonpublic, nonsectarian school. Meek v. 
Pittenger, 374 F . Supp., at 643. 
-
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the court entered its final judgment. 374 F . 
Supp. 639. In that judgment the court unanimously 
upheld the const itutionality of the textbook loan pro-
gram authorized by Act 195. Id., at 657-658. By a di-
vided vote the court also upheld the constitutionality of 
Act 194's provision of auxiliary services to children in 
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools and Act 195's 
authorization of loans of instructional material directly 
to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. Id., at 
653-659. The court unanimously invalidated that por-
tion of Act 195 authorizing the expenditure of Common-
wealth funds for the purchase of instructional equipment 
for loan to nonpublic schools, but only to the extent that 
the provision allowed the loan of equipment "which from 
its nature can be diverted to religious purposes." The 
court gave as examples projection and recording equip-
ment. Id., at 660-661. By a vote of 2-1, the court up-
held this provision of Act 195 insofar as it authorizes 
the loan of instruct ional equipment that cannot be readily 
diverted to religious uses. Ibid. 
Except with respect to that provision of Act 195 which 
permits loan of instructional equipment capable of di-
version, therefore, the plaintiffs' request for preliminary 
and final injunctive relief was denied. The plaintiffs 
(hereinafter the appellants) appealed directly to this 
Court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253.7 We noted prob~ 
able jurisdict ion. 419 U. S. 822. 
7 The appellants had alleged in their complaint that the statutes 
violate the Free Exercise Clause, as well as the Establishment Clause, 
arguing that compulsory taxation for the support of religious schools 
interferred with the free exercise of religion. The Dist rict Court 
held that "the impact of whatever miniscule burden of taxation 
which results to [the appellants] from the expenditures in question 
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In judging the constitutionality of the various forms of 
assistance authorized by Acts 194 and 195, the District 
Court applied the three-part test that has been clearly 
stated, if not easily applied, by this Court in recent Estab-
lishment Clause cases. See, e. g., Committee for Public 
Education & Religi01ts Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 
PJc!!3; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613. 
~the statute must have a secµlar legisla~ive 
purpose. E. g., Epperson v. ArkansM, 393 U. S. 97. 
~t must have a "J?rimary effect" that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits _r~on. 'E. g., School D"istrict of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203. c:::Third.J 
the statute and its administration must avoid excessive 
government entanglement with religion. E. g., Wal.Z-v. 
Ta:x Comm'n,391 0. S. 664. 
These tests constitute a convenient, accurate distilla-
tion of this Court's efforts over the past decades to evalu-
ate a wide range of governmental action challenged as 
violative of the constitutional prohibition against laws 
"respecting an establishment of religion," and thus pro-
vide the proper framework of analysis for the issues 
presented in the case before us. It is well to emphasize, \ 
however, that the tests must not be viewed as setting 
the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, 
but serve only as guideline~ with which to identify in-
stances in which the objectives of the Establishment 
Clause have been impaired. See Tilton v. Richardson, 
at 662. ' Judge Higginbotham, who concurred in part and dissented 
in part1 did not reach the Free Exercise question. See i,d., at 680 . . 
The appellants have not renewed their Free Exercise challenge in this 
Court. Nor have the appellees sought review of that segment of the 
District Court order invalidating so much of Act 195 as authorized 
loans of instructional equipment capable of being diverted to re-
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403 U. S. 672, 677-678 (plurality opinion of BURGER, 
C. J.). 
Primary among the evils against which the Establish-
ment Clause protects "have been 'sponsorship, financial 
support, and active ''involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activities.' Walz v. Tax Comm'n, su-pra, at 
688; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612." Committee 
for Publ-ic Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyqu-ist, 413 
U. S., at 772. The Court has broadly stated that "[n]o 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach 
or practice religion." Everson v. Board- of Education, 
330 U. S. 1, 16. But it is clear that not all legislative 
programs that provide indirect or incidental l>enefit to 
a religious institution are prohibited by the Constitution. 
See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 312; Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, at 614. "The problem, like many 
problems in constitutional law, is one of degree." Zorach 
v. Clauson, supra, at 314. 
III 
The District Court held that the textbook loan pro-1 
visions of Act 195 are constitutionally indistinguishable 
from the New York textbook loan program upheld in 
Board of E~ucation v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236. We agree. 
Approval of New York's textbook loan program in the 
Allen case was based primarily on this Court's earlier 
decision in Everson Y. Board of Educatwn, supra, holding 
that the constitutional prohibition against laws "respect-
ing an establishment of religion" did not prevent "New 
Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus 
fares of parochial school pupils as part of a general pro-
gram under which it pays the fares of pupils attending 
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the Court in Allen found that the New York textbook law 
"merely makes available to all children the benefits of 
a general program to lend school books free of charge. 
Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and owner-
ship remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus, 
no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and 
the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to 
schools." 392 U. S., at 243-244. The Court conceded 
that provision of free textbooks might make it "more 
likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian 
school, but that was true of the state-paid bus fares in 
Everson and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitu-
tional degree of support for a religious institution." Id., 
at 244. 
Like the New York program, the textbook provisions of 
Act 195 extend to all choolchildren the benefits of Penn-
sylvania s we -esta ished policy of lending textbooks free 
of charge to elementary and secondary school students.8 
As in Allen, Act 195 provides that the textbooks are to 
be lent directly to the student, not to the nonpublic school 
itself, although, again as in Allen, the administrative prac-
tice is to have student requests for the books filed initially 
with the nonpublic school and to have the school author-
8 New York in a single statute authorized the loan of textbooks 
without charge to students attending both public and nonpublic 
schools. N . Y. Educ. Law § 701 ; see Board of Education v. Allen, 
392 U.S., at 239. The Pennsylvania General Assembly has used two 
separate provisions of the Public School Code of 1949 to accomplish 
the same result. Pa. Stat. Tit. 24, § 8-801, requires that textbooks 
be provided free of charge for use in the Pennsylvania public schools. 
Act 195, Pa. Stat. Tit. 24, § 9-972, provides the authorization for 
the loan of textbooks to nonpublic elementary and secondary school 
students. So long as the textbook loan program includes all school- I 
children, those in public as well as those in private schools, it is of no 
constitutional significance whether the general program is codified 
in one statute tJr two. See Committee for Public Education & Re-
ligious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756; 782 n . 38. 
-
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ities prepare collective summaries of these requests which 
they forward to the appropriate public officials. See 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S., at 244 n. 6.9 
Thus, the financial benefit of Pennsylvania's textbook 
program, like New York's, is to parents and children, not 
to the nonpublic schools.1.0 
Under New York law the books that could be lent were 
limited to textbooks "which are designated for use in any 
public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are 
approved by any boards of education, trustees, or other 
school authorities." N. Y. Educ. Law § 701 (3). The 
law was construed by the New York Court of Appeals to 
apply solely to secular textbooks. Board of Education v. 
Allen, 20 '&. --Y. 2d 109, 117, 228 N. E. 2d 791, 794, 281 
N. Y. S. 2d 799, 805. Act 195 similarly limits the books 
that may be lent to "textbooks which are acceptable for 
use in any public, elementary, or secondary school of 
the Commonwealth." 11. Moreover, the record in the case 
9 Under both the Pennsylvania and New York textbook programs 
the nonpublic schools are permitted to store on their premises the 
textbooks being lent to the students. Compare Department of Edu-
cation, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Guidelines for the Admin-
istration of Acts 194 and 195, § 4.6, with Board of Education v. Allen, 
392 U.S., at 244 n. 6. 
10 In Pennsylvania, as in New York, prior to commencement of the 
state-supported textbook loan program, the parents of nonpublic 
schoolchildren had to purchase their own textbooks. See Meek v. 
Pittenger, 374 F . Supp., at 671 n. 11 (opinion of Higginbotham, J.) . 
1.1 Indeed, under the statutory scheme approved in Allen, the books 
lent to nonpublic school students might never in fact have been ap-
proved for use in any public school of the State. The statute per-
mitted the loan of books initially selected for use by the nonpublic 
schools themselves, subject only to subsequent approval by "any 
boards of education." See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S., 
at 269-272 (Fortas, J., dissenting). In contrast, only those books 
which have the antecedent approval of Pennsylvania school officials 
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before us, like the record in Allen, see, e. g., 392 U. S., at 
244-245, 248, contains no suggestion that religious text-
books will be lent or that the books provided will be used 
for anything other than purely secular purposes. 
In sum, the textbook loan provisions of Act 195 are in 
every material respect identical to the loan program 
approved in Allen. Pei'i°iisylvania, like New York, 
"merely makes ~ilable to all children the benefits of a 
general program to lend school books free of charge." 
As such, those provisions of Act 195 do not offend the 
constitutional prohibition against laws "respecting an 
establishment of religion." u 
IV 
Although textbooks are lent only to students, Act 19'5 
authorizes the loan ol'fnstructional material and equTp-
ment'<'cTirectly to qualiiying nonpublic elementary ag_d 
secondary schools in the Commonwealth. The appellants 
assert tfiat such@rect ai5!)o Pennsylvania's nonpublic 
schools, including cliurch-related institutions, constitutes 
an impermissible establishment of religion. 
12 The New Jersey textbook provisions invalidated in Public Funds 
for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F . Supp. 29, aff'd, 417 U. S. 961 , 
unlike the New York textb°ook program involved in Allen and the 
Pennsylvania program now before us, were not designed to extend to 
all schoolchildren of ~he State, whether attending public or nonpublic 
schools, the benefits of State-loaned textbooks. Although New Jersey 
public schoolchildren were lent their textbooks, § 5 of the Nonpublic 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, challenged in Marburger, 
provided that the State Commissioner of Education would reimburse 
the parents of nonpublic schoolchildren for money spent to purchase 
secular, nonideological textbooks. The District Court based its de-
cision that the textbook provisions violated the constitutional pro-
hibition against laws " respecting an establishment of religion" on 
the fact that the assistance provided-reimbursement for purchased 
textbooks-was not extended to parents of all students, but rather 
was directed exclusively to pa.rents whose children were enrolled 
in nonpublic, primarily religious schools. 358 F. Supp., at 36. 
-
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Act 195 is accompanied by legislative findings that the 
welfare of the Commonwealth requires that present and 
future generations of schoolchildren be assured ample 
opportunity to develop their intellectual capacities. Act 
195 is intended to further that objective by extending the 
benefits of free educational aids to every schoolchild in 
the Commonwealth , including nonpublic school students 
who comprise approximately one quarter of the school-
children in Pennsylvania. Act 195, § 1 (a), Pa. 
Stat. Tit. 24, § 9-972 (a). We accept the legitimacy of 111 
this secular legislatjye pureose. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, ' t 
403 U. S. 602, 609, 613; Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 
829-830. But we agree with the appellants that Qie I 
direct loan of mstruclional material and e uipment has 
the unconst1tutiona nmary effect o advancing religion 
because o t e predominant y re igious c aracter of the 
schools benefiting from the Act.13 
The only requirement imposed on nonpublic schools to 
qualify for loans of instructional material and equip-
ment is that they satisfy the Commonwealth's compul-
sory attendance law by providing, in the English lan-
guage, the subjects and activities prescribed by the 
standards of the State Board of Education. Pa. Stat. Tit. 
24, § 13-1327. Commonwealth officials, as a matter of 
state policy, do not inquire into the religious character-
istics, if any, of the nonpublic schools requesting aid pur-
suant to Act 195. The Coordinator of Nonpublic School 
Services, the chief administrator of Acts 194 and 195, 
testified that a school would not be barred from receiving 
'1a Because we have concluded that the direct loan of instructional 
material and equipment to church-related schools has the impermissi-
ble effect of advancing religion, there is no need to consider whether I 
:;uch aid would result in excessive entanglement of the Common-
wealth with religion through "comprehensive, discriminating, and 
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' ( loans of instructional material and equipment\e~ th~gh its dominant purpose was the iD£Ulcation of rit ligious values, even if it imposed religious restrictions on 
admissions or on faculty appointments, and even if it 
required attendance at classes in theology or at religious 
services. In fact, of the 1,320 nonpublic schools in Penn-
sylvania that comply with the requirements of the com-
pulsory attendance law and thus qualify for aid under 
Act 195, more than 75% are Roman Catholic Diocesan 
schools. Thus, the primary beneficiaries of Act 195's in-
~rucUonal material and equipment loan provisions, like 
the beneficiaries of the "secular educational services" re-
imbursement program considered in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
and the parent tuition reimbursement plan considered in 
Sloan v. Lemon, are nonpublic schools with a predom-
inant sectarian character.14 
It is, of course true that as part of general le · ation 
made avai able to all students, a State ma me u e 
church-related schoois in ro rams provi mg us trans-
portation, school lunches, and pu c ea t aci 1t1es-
s~ and nonideological services unrelated to the ri-
mary, re ig1ous-onented e ucationa unction of the 
sectarian ~chool. The indirect and incidental benefits 
to church-related schools from those programs do not 
offond the constitutional prohibition against establish-
ment of religion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, supra; Lemon v. Kurtzman, SUJNa, at 616-617; 
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S., at 775. But the massive aid provided ) 
the church-related nonpublic schools of Pennsylvania by 
Act 195 is neither indirect nor incidental. 
14 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 610, this Court found that 
96% of the nonpublic elementary and secondary school students 
in Pennsylvania in 1969 attended church-related schools. See also 
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For the 1972--1973 school year the Commonwealth 
authorized just under $12 million of direct aid to 
the predominantly church-related nonpublic schools of 
Pennsylvania through the loan of instructional material 
and equipment pursuant to Act 195.15 To be sure, the- \ 
material and equipment that are the subjects of the loan-
maps, charts, and laboratory equipment, for example-
are "self-polic [ingl, in that starting as secular, nonicleo-
logical and neutral, they wil1 not change in use." Meek 
v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp., at 660. But faced with the 
substantial amounts of direct support authorized by Act 
195, it would simply ignore realit to attem t to se arate 
secular e ucationa unctions from t e predominantly 
r~ligious roTe performed by many of Pennsylvania's 
aTiurch-related elementary and secondary schools and to 
ttnm characterize Act 195 as channeling aid to the secular· 
without providing direct aid to the sectarian. Even 
though earmarked for secular purposes, "when it flows 
to an fostitntion in which religion iE: so pervasive that 
a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in 
the religious mission." state aid has the impermissible· 
primary eiiect of advancing religion. Hunt v. McNair,. 
413 u. s. 734, 743. 
15 An additional $4,670,000 was appropriated in the 1972-1973; 
school year for the acquisition of textbooks for loan to nonpublic 
school students pursuant to Act 195. The total 1972-1973 appropri-
ation under Act 195 was $16,660,000. The appropriation was in-
creased by $900,000 to $17,560,000 for the 1973-1974 school year. 
The potentially divisive political effect of aid programs like Act 195, 
which are dependent on continuing annual appropriations and which 
generate increasing demands as costs and population grow, was em-
phasized by this Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 622-624, 
and Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
413 U. S., at 794 798. "[W]h1le the prospect of such divisiveness 
may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that otherwise 
survive the careful scmtiny required by the decisionS' of this Court, 
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The church-related elementary and secondary schools 
that are the primary· beneficiaries of Act 195's instruc-
tional material and equipment loans typify such religion-
pervasive institutions. The very purpose of many of I 
: tho$e schools is to pro-yide an integrated secular and 
religious edu~ation ; the teaching process is, to a large 
extent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and 
belief. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 616-617. 
Substantial aid to t.he educational function of such 
schools, aacordingly, necessarily results 1n aid to the sec~ 
ttr'ran school enterpr1se as a whole. "[T]he secular" 
ectu~ation those schools provide goes hand in hand with 
the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' 
existence. Within : the institution, the two are· inextri-
cably intertwined." JJ.,. at 657 (opinion of BRENNAN, 
J.). See generally "Treund, Public Aid to Parochial 
Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1688-1689. For this ' 
reason, Act 195's direct aid to Pennsylvania's predomi-
nantly church-related, nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools, even though ostensibly limited to wholly 
. n~utral, secular instructional material and equipment, 
, inescapably results in the direct and substantial-advance-
ment of religious activity, cf. Committee fo1' Public Edu-
cation · & R.eligiou~ Libert_y v. Nyq_u-ist, 413 U. S., at 
781-183, h . 39, and thus constitutes an impermissible 
establishment of religion.16 
16 Our conclusion that Act 195's instructional material and equip-/ 
ment loan provisions are unconstitutional is directly supported, if not 
compell.ed, by this Court's affirmance last Term of Public Funds-
/or Publi,c Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, aff'd, 417 U. S. 
961. The Marburger District Court invalidated as violating the 
constitutional- prohibition against ~blishmeiit of religion New Jer-
sey's ·provision of instructional material and equipment to nonpublic 
elementary and secondary schools. New Jersey's program did not 
differ in any material respect from the loan provisions of Act 195. 
See id.
1 
at 36-37. After finding that the nonpublic schools aided, 
-
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Unlike Act 195, which provides only for the loan of 
teaching material and equipment, Act 194 authorizes the 
Secretary of Education, through the intermediate units, 
to supply professional staff, as well as supportive ma-
terials, equipment, and personnel, to the nonpublic 
schools of the Commonwealth. The "auxiliary services" 
authorized by Act 194-remedial and accelerated instruc-
tion, guidance counseling and testing, speech and hearing 
services-are provided directl:y to nonpublic schoolchil-
dren with the appropriate special need. But the services 
are provided only on the nonpublic school premises, and 
only when "requested by nonpublic school representa-
tives." Department of Education, Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Guidelines for the Administration of Acts 
194 and 195, ·§ 1.3 . .. 
The legislative · findings accompanying Act 194 are 
virtually identical to tho.se in Act 195 : Act 194 is intended 
to assure full development of the intellectual capacities 
of the children of Pennsylvania by extending the bene-
fits of free auxiliary services to all students in the Com• 
monwealth: Act 194; § 1 (a), Pa. ·St~t .. Tit. 24, § 9-972 
(a) . The appellants concede the validity of this secul~r 
legislative purpose. Nonetheless, they argue. that Act 
194 constitutes ar. impermissible establishment of re-
for the most part, were church-related or religious-affiliated educa-
tional institutions, id., at 34} the court held that the program had a 
primary effect of advancing religion. Id., at 37. The court also held, 
as did the District Court in the ca~ before us, that excessive en-
tanglement of church and state woul\i result from attempts to police 
use of material and equipment that was readily divertible to religious 
uses. Id., at 38-39. This Court's affirmance of the result in Mar-
burger was a decision on the merits, entitled to precedential weight. 
See Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 670-671; cf. Cincinnati, N. 0 . 
& T. P.R. Co. v. Unite<l States, 400. U.S. 932, 935 (WHITE, J ., dis-
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ligion because the auxiliary services are provided at pre-
dominantly church-related schools.17 
In rejecting the appellants' ~rgument, the District 
Court emphasized that "auxiliary services" are provided 
directly to the children involved and are expressly limited 
to those services whidr,are secular, neutral, and nonideo-
logical. The court also noted that , the instruction and 
counseling in question served only to supplement the 
basic, normal educational offerings of the qualifying non-
public schools. Any benefits to chvrch-related schools 
that may result from the provision of such services, the 
District Court concluded,· are merely incidental and indi-
rect, and thus not impermissible. See 374 F. Supp., at 
656-657. The court also held that no continuing super-
vision of the personnel providing auxiliary services would 
be necessary to establish that Act 194's secular limitations· 
were opserved or to guarantee that a member of the 
auxiliary services staff had not "succumb [ edJ to sectari-
anization of his or her professional work." Id., at 657. 
We need not decide whether substantial state expendi-
tures to enrich the curricula of church-related elementary 
and secondary school§,18 like the expenditure of state 
funds to support the bitsic educational program of those 
schools, necessarily restJlts in: the direct and substantial 
' ' 
-advancement of religious act ivity. For decisions of this 
Court make clear that the I>istrict Court erred in relying 
entirely on the good faith and professionalism of the sec-
ular teachers and counselors functioning in church-re-
17 Because Acts 194 and 195 impose identical qualificat ion require-
ments, compare Act 194, § 1 (c) , Pa. Stat. Tit. 24, § 9-972 (c), with 
Act 195, §§ l'(c ), (e ) , Pa . Stat. Tit. 24, §§ 9-972 (c), {e), the same 
schools are eligible for aid under each Act. 
1.sMore than $14 million was appropriated in the 1972-1973 
school year to provide auxiliary services for nonpublic school students 
p~rsuant to Act 194. The amount was increased to $17,880,000 for 
the 197.3-1974 school year, 
-
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lated schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological pos-
ture is maintained. 
In Early .v. DiCenso, a companion case to Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, the Court invalidated a Rhode Island 
statute authorizing salary supplements for teachers of 
secular subjects in nonpublic schoqls. The Court ex-
pressly ' rejected the proposition, relied upon by the Dis-
trict Court in the case before us, that it was sufficient for 
the State to assume that teachers in church-related schools 
would succeed in segregating their religious beliefs from 
their secular educational duties. 
"We need not ~nd do not assume that teachers in 
parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any 
conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by 
the statute and the First Amendment . ... 
"But the potential for impermissible fostering of 
religion is present. . . . The State must be certain, 
given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers 
do not inculcate religion .... 
"A comprehensive, discriminating, and continu-
ing stat~ surveillance .will ifl.evitably be required to 
ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First 
Amendment otherwise respected ... . " 403 U. S., at 
618-619. 
The prophylactic contacts required to ensure that 
teachers play a strictly nonjdeological role, the Court 
'·.· I. -
held, necessarily give rise to 8' _con~Mtutionally intolerable 
degree of entanglement between church and state. Id., 
at 619. ~Ile same excessive entanglement would be re-
quired for Pennsylvania to be "certain," as it must be, 
that Act l94 personnel do not advance the religious mis-
sion of the church•telated schools · in which they serve. 
Public Funds far Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. 
Supp. 29, 40-41, aff'd, 417 U.S. 961.19 
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.That Act 194 authorizes state-funding of teachers only 
for remedial and exceptional students, and not for normal 
students participating in the core curriculum, does not 
distinguish this case from Early v. DiCenso and Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra. Whether the subject is "remedial 
reading," "advanced reading," or simply "reading," a 
teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious 
doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction 
persists. The likelihood of inadvertent fostering of re-
ligion nrn,y be less in a remedial arithmetic class than in a 
medieva: history seminar, but a diminished probability 
of impermissible conduct is not sufficient: "The State 
must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that sub-
sidized teachers do not inculcate religion." 403 U. S., at 
619. And a state-subsidized guidance counselor is surely 
as likely as a state-subsidized chemistry teacher to fail on 
occasion to separate religious instruction and the advance-
ment of religious beliefs from his secular educational 
responsibilities. 20 
material and equipment to nonpublic schools, see n. 16, supra, the-
District Court in Marburger struck down the State's program t-0 
supply nonpublic schools with "auxiliary services." New Jersey de--
fined "auxiliary services" in substantially the same manner as Penn-
sylvania, and the administration of the New Jersey program did not 
differ significantly from the administration of Act 194. See 358 F. 
Supp., at 39. The District Court held that the auxiliary services 
program "is unconstitutional by reason of the church-state admin-
istrative entanglement it would produce." Id., at 40. This Court';; 
affirmance of Marburger is a decision on the merits as to the consti-
tutionality of New Jersey's auxiliary services program, and is en-
titled to precedential weight. 
20 Act 194's authorization of "speech and hearing services," at least 
to the extent such services are diagnostic, seems to fall within that 
class of general welfare services for children that may be provided' 
by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues to 
church-related schools. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 
supra. Although the Act cont,ains a severability clause, Act 194, § 2, 
in view of the fact that speech and hearing services constitute a minor· 
-
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The fact that the teachers and counselors providing 
auxiliary services are employees of the public intermedi-
ate unit, rather than of the church-related schools in 
which they work, does not substantially eliminate the 
need for continuing surveillance. To be sure, auxiliary 
services personnel, because not employed by the non-
public schools, are not directly subject to the discipline 
of a religious authority. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S., at 618. But they are performing important educa-
tional services in schools in which education is an integral 
part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an 
atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious 
belief is constantly maintained. See id., at 618-619. 
The potential for impermissible fostering of religion 
under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, 
is nonetheless present. To be certain that auxiliary 
teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Constitution 
demands, the State would have to impose limitations on 
the activities of auxiliary personnel and then engage in 
some form of continuing surveillance to ensure that those 
restrictions were being followed.21 
In addition, Act 194, like the statutes considered in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, and Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, creates-
portion of the "amdliary services" authorized by Act 194, we cannot 
assume that the Pennsylvania General Assembly would have passed 
the law solely to provide such aid. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S., 
at 824. Indeed, none of the appellees has suggested that the severa-
bility clause be utilized to save any portion of Act 194 in the event 
this Court finds the major substance of the Act constitutionally· 
invalid . 
21 The presence of auxiliar~• teachers in church-related schools,. 
moreover, has the potential for provoking controversy be-· 
tween the Commonwealth and religious• authorities over the extent 
of the teachers' responsibilities and the meaning of the legislative andl 
administrative restrictions on the content of their inS>trllliCtromi. See.-
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a serious potential for divisive conflict over the issue of 
aid to religion-"entanglement in the broader sense of 
political strife." Committee for Public Educatwn & 
Religious Liberty v. N yquist, supra, at 794. The re-
current nature of the appropriation process guarantees 
annual reconsideration of Act 194 and the prospect of 
repeated confrontation between proponents and oppo-
nents of the auxiliary services program. The Act thus 
provides successive opportunities for political fragmenta-
tion and division along religious lines, one of the principal 
evils against which the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to proteet. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 
622-623. This potential for political entanglement, to-
gether with the administrative entanglement which would 
be necessary to ensure that auxiliary services personnel 
remain strictly neutral and nonideological when function-
ing in church-related schools, compels the conclusion that 
Act 194 violates the constitutional prohibition against 
laws "respecting an establishment of religion." 
The judgment of the District Court as to Act 194 is 
reversed; its judgment as to the textbook provisions of 
Act 195 is affirmed, but as to that Act's other provisions 
now before us its judgment is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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